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34 PEOPLE v. NYE [38 C.2d 
validity in the light of the plain wording of the statute pre-
scribing the applicable limitations affecting the venue ques-
tion. While there is language in some of the earlier cases 
tending to support the defendants' position (e.g. Sullivan v. 
Lusk, 7 Cal.App. 186, 189-190 [94 P. 91, 92]), the effect of 
joinder in the venue motion or consent to the change was not 
a point in issue, and such language must be disapproved 
as constituting an incorrect statement of the law under the 
applicable statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 395; see Aisbett v. 
Paradise Mo1tntain Mining & Milling Co., supra, 21 Cal.App. 
267, 269-270; White v. Anderson, 50 Cal.App.2d 634, 636 
[123 P.2d 543] .) Rather here as in other cases in which 
venue depends upon the residence of a defendant, the general 
rule prevails in determining the "proper county for the trial 
of the action'' and the consent of the resident defendant to 
the proposed transfer cannot deprive the plaintiffs of their 
right to have the action tried in the county of the consenting 
defendant's residence. (Independent Iron Works v. American 
President Lines, supra, 35 Cal.2d 858, 860.) 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, 
J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 5253. In Bank. Nov. 13, 1951.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FREDERICK LEO NYE, 
Appellant. 
[1] Rape-Assault With Intent to Commit Rape-Intent.-The 
crime of assault with intent to commit rape was committed if, 
when he made the assault, defendant intended to have sexual 
intercourse with his victim and to use force to overcome her 
resistance. 
[2] !d.-Assault With Intent to Commit Rape-Intent.-When a 
strange man enters a woman's bedroom, covers her mouth with 
his hand, grasps her wrist while she screams and kicks, releases 
her when she bites his hand, and makes no effort to take any 
[1] See 22 Cal.Jur. 368; 44 Am.Jur. 917. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Rape, § 11(2); [3] Criminal Law, 
§394; [4] Rape, §63(1); [5] Criminal Law, §277; [6] Crimi-
nal Law, §143; [7] Rape, §SO; [8] Rape, §63(2); [9] Rape, 
§96(6). 
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property, it is reasonable to infer that he intended to commit 
rape, particularly when such an intent is shown by his attempt 
to rape another woman under similar circumstances. 
[3] Criminal Law-Evidence-Other Crimes-Sexual Offenses.-
Evidence of an attempt to rape one woman is admissible to 
show that defendant's acts against another woman under simi-
lar circumstances were committed with intent to commit rape. 
[4] Rape-Assault With Intent to Commit Rape-Evidence.-De-
fend-ant's admission to police officers that "he intended to have 
sexual intercourse" with a prosecuting witness may not be 
interpreted as merely showing that he intended peacefully to 
solicit sexual relations, and a conviction of assault with intent 
to commit rape on her is supported by evidence that, on enter-
ing her bedroom, he used such force as placing his hand over 
her mouth and grasping her wrist, and by the fact that he had 
never seen her before. 
[5] Criminal Law-Rebuttal Evidence.-Where defendant denied 
making any admissions to police officers that "he intended to 
have sexual intercourse" with a prosecuting witness, as testified 
to by one of the officers, and offered evidence of an alibi, it is 
proper, on rebuttal, to allow the other officer to testify regard-
ing defendant's admissions, and to permit a woman, who lived 
in the motel of the prosecutrix' residence, to testify that, on 
two separate occasions, defendant entered her bedroom within 
a few minutes of the time the alleged assaults were committed. 
(Pen. Code, § 1093.) 
[6] !d.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Dismissal of a 
count charging attempted rape is not tantamount to an ac-
quittal under a count charging assault with intent to commit 
rape, whether or not the two counts charge different statements 
of the same offense or two offenses of the same class of offenses. 
(Pen. Code, § 954.) 
[7] Rape-Assault With Intent to Commit Rape-Cautionary In-
structions.-Even if a cautionary instruction is not requested 
by defendant in a prosecution for assault with intent to com-
mit rape, it is incumbent on the court to give such an instruc-
tion on its own motion whether the alleged victim is a child 
or a mature person. 
[8] !d.-Assault With Intent to Commit Rape-Evidence.-A con-
viction of assault with intent to commit rape is permitted on 
the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting witness. 
[3] Admissibility, in prosecution for sexual offense, of evidence 
of other similar offense, note, 167 A.L.R. 565. See, also, 8 Cal.Jur. 
74; 20 Am.Jur. 297. 
[5] See 8 Cal.Jur. 236. 
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[9] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-Failure to give 
a cautionary instruction in a prosecution for assaults to com-
mit rape is not prejudicial and a judgment of conviction will 
not be reversed where, in view of the evidence as to defend-
ant's admissions and the testimony of a third woman making 
plausible the testimony of the two prosecuting witnesses, it is 
improbable that the jury would have rejected the testimony 
of the prosecuting witnesses had a cautionary instruction been 
given. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. Ed-
win L. Jefferson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape. Judg-
ment of conviction affirmed. 
Gladys Towles Root and Herbert Grossman for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E. 
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment en-
tered on a jury verdict finding him guilty on two counts of 
assault with intent to commit rape and from the order denying 
his motion for a new trial. The sentences for the two offenses 
run concurrently. 
The conviction on the first count is for an assault with 
intent to commit rape on Miss W. on May 7, 1950, in Burbank. 
Defendant entered Miss W. 's house-trailer early in the morn-
ing. ·when she awakened and asked what he wanted, defend-
ant tore off the bed covers and ripped her nightgown down to 
her knees. He grasped her throat and threatened to kill her 
if she screamed. He exposed his genital organs, got on the 
bed on top of Miss Vl. and attempted to accomplish sexual 
intercourse despite her resistance. In the course of the attack 
Miss W. 's alarm clock rang, and as defendant reached to turn 
it off he released his grasp of her throat. He then left, after 
threatening Miss W. with death if she reported the attack. 
Defendant does not contend that the evidence was insufficient 
to support his conviction on this count. 
The conviction on the second count was for an assault with 
intent to commit rape on Mrs. P., on May 27, 1950 in a motel 
in Burbank. Defendant entered Mrs. P.'s bedroom early in 
the morning. She awakened as he was closing the door. When 
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she asked what he wanted, he came to her bed, placed his hand 
over her mouth and grasped her wrist. She screamed and 
kicked, and when she bit his hand he fled from the room. 
He did not expose himself or get on the bed with her and 
made no attempt to take any property. 
Miss W. and Mrs. P. identified defendant as their assailant. 
'rwo police officers testified that defendant had admitted that 
he attacked the two women and that his purpose in entering 
the motel was to have sexual intercourse with Mrs. P. Miss F., 
a resident of the motel, testified that on May 27th, the day of 
the assault on Mrs. P., defendant opened the door to Miss F.'s 
room about 7 :30 in the morning, looked in, and closed the 
door. Miss F. also testified that on May 7th, the day of the 
assault on Miss W., defendant entered Miss F.'s room, stood 
by the bed, and left when he saw that she had awakened. 
Defendant denied having seen either of the prosecuting 
witnesses before the trial and introduced evidence of an alibi. 
The jury rejected his defense and found him guilty on both 
counts. 
Defendant contends that testimony regarding his admission 
that he intended to have sexual intercourse with Mrs. P. was 
improperly admitted, on the ground that the People did not 
first establish that the crime had been committed, and that, 
even with his admission, the evidence is insufficient to support 
the conviction on that count. 
[1] The crime of assault with intent to commit rape was 
committed, if defendant intended to have sexual intercourse 
with his victim and to use force to overcome her resistance. 
(People v. Ltttes, 79 Cal.App.2d 233 [179 P.2d 815]; People 
v. Harshaw, 71 Cal.App.2d 146, 149 [161 P.2d 978] .) Defend-
ant concedes that an assault on Mrs. P. was shown by the 
evidence, but contends that his conduct, standing alone, does 
not show the intent with which he made the assault. 
[2] When a strange man enters a woman's bedroom, 
covers her mouth with his hand, grasps her wrist while she 
screams and kicks, releases her when she bites his hand, and 
makes no effort to take any property, it is reasonable to infer 
that he intended to commit rape, particularly when such an 
intent is shown by his attempt to rape another woman under 
similar circumstances. [3] The evidence of the attempt. to 
rape Miss W. was clearly admissible to show that defendant's 
acts against Mrs. P. were committed with the intent to commit 
rape .. ''In such cases, former acts of the same kind are rele-
vant to negative the intent as being of any other kind than to 
' . •\ .' 
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commit rape. Where the charge is of assault with intent, 
the propriety of such evidence cmmot be doubted.'' ( 2 Wig-
more, Evidence, 3d ed., § 357; People v. W estek, 31 Cal.2d 469, 
480 [190 P.2d 9]; People v. Coltrin, 5 Cal.2d 649 [55 P.2d 
1161]; see People v. Clapp, 67 Cal.App.2d 197 [153 P.2d 758]; 
People v. Cosby, 137 Cal.App. 332 [31 P.2d 218]; 1 Wharton, 
Evidence in Criminal Cases, § 252, 167 A.L.R. 565, 600.) 
[4] Defendant contends that the admission that "he in-
tended to have sexual intercourse" with Mrs. P. went no 
farther than to show that he intended peacefully to solicit 
sexual relations. In the light of the evidence of the force 
used and the fact that defendant had never seen Mrs. P. before, 
the jury could reasonably reject that interpretation of his 
admission. vVith the evidence of the admission properly 
before the jury, any doubts as to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the conviction for assault with intent to 
commit rape are resolved. (See People v. Mm:chtry, 37 Cal.2d 
385 [231 P.2d 847] ; People v. Bradley, 71 Cal.App.2d 114 
[162 P.2d 38] ; People v. Finkel, 70 Cal.App.2d 508 [161 P.2d 
298]; People v. Cosby, 137 Cal.App. 332 [31 P.2d 218].) 
The present case is clearly distinguishable from the prin-
cipal case relied on by defendant, People v. Fleming, 94 Cal. 
308 [29 P. 647]. There, the prosecutrix was a servant girl 
employed by the defendant. He entered her bedroom late at 
night and, after promises, persuasions, and arguments, left 
her room. The court properly stated: "It can hardly be 
said that the defendant used force to any degree, and from 
all circumstances of the affair, it would appear that physical 
violence was not an element in his mind in attempting to 
carry out his intentions. There was no duress upon the part 
of the prosecutrix, no fear of personal violence, for there were 
no threats of violence." ( 94 Cal. at 312.) Similarly, in 
People v. Mullen, 45 Cal.App.2d 297 [114 P.2d 11], the de-
fendant ardently forced unwelcome attentions on the prosecu-
trix, but did not threaten violence, and ceased his efforts and 
allowed the girl to walk away after she resisted him. In neither 
the Fleming nor the Mullen case did the prosecution offer 
evidence of other similar conduct that showed defendant's 
intent to commit rape. 
Defendant next contends that the court improperly ad-
mitted rebuttal testimony over his objections. In the prosecu-
tion's case in chief, Officer Brennan testified regarding de-
fendant's admissions. The two prosecuting witnesses testified 
regarding defendant's conduct in their bedrooms. Defendant 
then testified in his own behalf and offered evidence of an 
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alibi, claiming that he had never seen the two women before 
the preliminary examination. He admitted that he had been 
arrested by Officers Brennan and Loranger, but denied making 
any admissions. 
On rebuttal, Officer Loranger testified regarding defend-
ant's admissions and Miss F. testified that the defendant had 
entered her bedroom on May 7th and May 27th, the dates of 
the two assaults. 
Defendant relies on People v. Rodriguez, 58 CaLApp.2d 
415 [136 P.2d 626], where the People withheld the confession 
during the case in chief, and offered it for the first time in 
rebuttal without proof that it was voluntarily made. [5] In 
the present case, the People did not withhold a material part 
of the case until rebuttal, but offered rebuttal testimony to 
support their case in chief after it had been controverted by 
the defendant. The evidence was properly admitted. (Pen. 
Code, § 1093; People v. Moore, 81 Cal.App.2d 799 [185 P.2d 
32] ; People v. Gerbel, 71 Cal.App.2d 325 [162 P.2d 946] ; 
see People v. Avery, 35 Cal.2d 487, 491 [218 P.2d 527]; 
8 Cal.Jur. 236.) 
Defendant was charged in Count II of the information 
with the crime of attempted rape on Mrs. P. and in Count IV 
with the crime of assault with intent to commit rape on her. 
After evidence was introduced and defendant was in jeop-
ardy, the court dismissed Count II on motion of the district 
attorney. Defendant was convicted on Count IV. He now 
contends that the di~missal of Count II was tantamount to 
an acquittal on Count IV, on the ground that an assault with 
intent to commit rape is simply an attempt to commit rape. 
[6] An indictment or information may charge ''different 
statements of the same offense or two or more different offenses 
of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts'' 
and a verdict of acquittal on one count is not an acquittal on 
any other count. (Pen. Code, § 954.) Thus, whether or not 
Counts II and IV charged different statements of the same 
offense or two offenses of the same class of offenses, the dis-
missal of Count II was not tantamount to an acquittal on 
Count IV. (People v. Godina, 30 Cal.2d 356, 360 [181 P.2d 
881].) 
Defendant contends finally that the trial court erred in not 
giving a cautionary instruction to the effect that since charges 
of sex offenses are easy to make and difficult to disprove, the 
testimony of the prosecuting witnesses should be examined 
with caution. 
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[7] Even if a cautionary instruction is not requested by 
the defendant, it is incumbent upon the court in cases such 
as this to give such an instruction on its own motion whether 
the alleged victim is a child or a mature person. (People v. 
Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 890 [129 P.2d 367]; People v. Lucas, 
16 Cal.2d 178 [105 P.2d 102, 130 A.L.R. 1485] .) Rape is 
''an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and 
harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so 
innocent." (Sir Matthew Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown, 634.) 
[8] A conviction is permitted on the uncorroborated testi-
mony of the prosecuting witness. Although protection of the 
public makes it necessary to allow convictions on such testi-
mony, since the offense is usually committed in secret, the 
usual defense can only be a denial that the offense was com-
mitted by the defendant or in the case of forcible rape that 
the prosecuting witness voluntarily consented to the sexual 
act. Whether the prosecuting· witness is a child or a mature 
person, the verdict will usually turn on whether the jury 
believes the defendant's or the victim's version of the occur-
rence, and there is the same danger of misinterpreting the 
defendant's acts as well as the danger of spite, blackmail, 
vindictiveness, private vengeance, neurotic fabrication or 
fanciful imagination. 
The circumstances of each case determine whether failure 
to give the instruction was prejudicial. In the cases in which 
judgments were reversed for failure to give the instruction, 
it was not improbable that the jury would have returned a 
different verdict had the cautionary instruction been given. 
In People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885 [129 P.2d 367], the evi-
dence against the defendant consisted primarily of the testi-
mony of a 12-year-old boy. The boy's testimony was incon-
sistent, and the acts of defendant were circumscribed. In 
People v. Rankins, 66 Cal.App.2d 956 [153 P.2d 399], the 
defendant was convicted of statutory rape and incest on the 
uncorroborated testimony of his 16-year-old daughter. The 
girl's testimony was inconsistent, and other evidence indi-
cated that motives of spite might have led to her accusation. 
In People v. Trumbo, 60 Cal.App.2d 681 [141 P.2d 225], 
a conviction for lewd conduct with a child was based on incon-
sistent testimony of two young girls. The parents of the girls 
corroborated their testimony, but the court held that under 
all the circumstances failure to give a cautionary instruction 
was reversible error. In People v. Williams, 55 Cal.App.2d 
696 [131 P.2d 851], the prosecutrix was a mature woman, and 
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the offense charged was forcible rape. Circumstantial evidence 
indicated that the proseeutrix had consented to the intercourse, 
and, again, refusal to give a cautionary instruction was held 
to be prejudicial. 
Under the circumstances of several other cases, failure to 
give a cautionary instruction was not prejudicial. In People 
v. Lucas, 16 Cal.2d 178 [105 P.2d 102, 130 A.L.R. 1485], 
this court held that the trial court should have given the 
instruction, but affirmed the judgment since the record elearly 
pointed to the defendant's guilt. The same result has been 
reached when there was evidence of corroborating facts and 
circumstances, and the unequivocal nature of the defendant's 
acts could leave no doubt as to his purpose. (People v. Owsley, 
76 Cal.App.2d 166 [172 P.2d 561]; People v. Finkel, 70 Cal. 
App.2d 508 [161 P.2d 298] ; People v. Meyers, 62 Cal.App.2d 
24 [144 P.2d 60] ; People v. Fleming, 58 Cal.App.2d 37 [136 
P.2d 88]; People v. M1trnrnert, 57 Cal.App.2d 849 [135 P.2d 
665] .) 
[9] In the present case, the evidence as to defendant's 
admissions and the testimony of Miss F. lend plausibility to 
the testimony of the two prosecuting witnesses. To acquit 
defendant, the jury would have had to reject the testimony 
of the women in its entirety, or reject their identifications 
of defendant as the man who entered their bedrooms, or decide 
that defendant had not intended to have sexual intercourse 
with them by force. A careful examination of the entire 
record in accord with article VI, section 4lh of the California 
Constitution, leads us to the conclusion that it is improbable 
that the jury would have rejected the testimony of the prose-
cuting witnesses had a cautionary instruction been given and 
that there has therefore been no miscarriage of justice requir-
ing reversal of the judgment. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a new 
trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I do not feel that the evidence in support of the second 
count (assault with intent to commit rape on Mrs. P.) was 
sufficient to uphold the judgment of conviction. The infer-
ence that he had entered the room with intent to commit 
larceny is as readily deducible from the evidence in support 
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of this count, as is the inference that he intended peacefully 
to solicit sexual relations with her. I£ the evidence as to the 
assault on Miss W., 20 days prior to the act in question, had 
not been admitted in support of the second count, no one 
could doubt that the evidence would have been insufficient 
~o uphold the judgment. 
My views, with respect to the admission of evidence of 
crimes other than that which is charged against the defendant 
and for which he is being tried, have been expressed many 
times (see dissent People v. Dabb, 32 Cal.2d 491, 501 [197 
P.2d 1]; People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469, 483 [190 P.2d 9]; 
People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d 306, 322 [169 P.2d 924] ; People v. 
Zatzke, 33 Cal.2d 480, 486 [202 P.2d 1009]) and, so long as 
this court continues to sanction a procedure so manifestly 
unjust, will be expressed many more times. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
10, 1951. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 21772. In Bank. Nov. 16, 1951.] 
Estate of WILLIAM TARRANT, Deceased. BEN H. BROWN, 
as Public Administrator, etc., et al., Respondents, v. 
GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al., 
Appellants. 
[1] Charities-Attitude of Court.-Courts look with favor on all 
attempted charitable donations, and will endeavor to carry 
them into effect if it can be done consistently with the rules 
of law. 
[2] !d.-What Purposes are Charitable.-Provisions for the sup-
port, aid and help of tradesmen, handicraftsmen and "persons 
decayed" are recognized as charitable in their design to ac-
complish objects which are beneficial to the community. 
[3] Id.-Scope.-Scope of word "charity" changes and enlarges 
with the needs of men and must advance with progress of 
civilization so as to encompass varying wants of humanity 
properly coming within its spirit. 
[1] See 5 Cal.Jur. 18; 10 Am.Jur. 593. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Charities, § 4; [2, 3, 5, 7-9, 16] 
Charities,§ 1; [6] Charities,§ 2; [10] Charities, § 32; [11] Wills, 
§ 320; [12] Charities, § 37; [13-15] Charities, § 18; [17] Appeal 
and Error, § 1273. 
